"The mind-body problem arises only when we conflate this conceptual and linguistic dualism with an ontological dualism of substance."
Just finished a book on panpsychism (Christian de Quincey's 'Radical Nature') which is a logically oriented argument for it.
Early on in the book he states "Noncausal. Quantum events are not causal. They are inherently unpredictable. The exact instant when an electron jumps orbit, or when a radioactive particle is emitted from an atom, is entirely random, entirely uncaused. To say that an event is "entirely uncaused" amounts, logically, to saying that it is "self-caused"; and this, as philosopher Arthur Young argued, is tantamount to saying that the event chooses, that is, exhibits consciousness (Young, 1976a)." He utilizes quantum physics in part as evidence of matter having choice, or rather being intertwined with choice. His questions are much along the lines of matter and consciousness, primarily how does one ontological substance (objectivity) birth another ontological substance (subjectivity) and gain sentience. He's more along the lines of Whiteheadian process philosophy, as opposed to substance thinking. "Instead of asking 'How can I know of any other being is sentient?' the [other] question asks, 'How can I know if there is any other creature without consciousness or sentience?'" Also, "Without confirming evidence that consciousness or experience can occur only in connection with a brain, we should remain open to the possibility that consciousness may exist in the absence of a brain."
Lots of epistemological-ontological talk, brief examinations of extra-rational ways of knowing and understanding things. "Given that what is at issue is the mind-body relationship, it makes sense to use the body as an instrument of knowing as well as using the rational capacities."
His reasoning against materialism is simple: materialists must "(1) deny that consciousness or experience is ontologically a different kind from matter-energy; or (2) explain how ontological emergence could occur. [...] If (1), the materialists need to explain how subjectivity and objectivity could be identical in kind. [...] If (2), materialists need to explain how subjectivity could emerge from objectivity, how qualia could arise ex nihilo--how, in short, an entirely new ontological kind could emerge." The same goes for dualism, dualists must explain how mind and matter interact if they are two ontological substances.
I've long found it unconvincing to assume mind and emotions emerged from entirely unfeeling, mechanistic matter, and until de Quincey I'd never seen it proposed in a philosophical manner that matter and mind are intertwined.
Just finished a book on panpsychism (Christian de Quincey's 'Radical Nature') which is a logically oriented argument for it.
Early on in the book he states "Noncausal. Quantum events are not causal. They are inherently unpredictable. The exact instant when an electron jumps orbit, or when a radioactive particle is emitted from an atom, is entirely random, entirely uncaused. To say that an event is "entirely uncaused" amounts, logically, to saying that it is "self-caused"; and this, as philosopher Arthur Young argued, is tantamount to saying that the event chooses, that is, exhibits consciousness (Young, 1976a)." He utilizes quantum physics in part as evidence of matter having choice, or rather being intertwined with choice. His questions are much along the lines of matter and consciousness, primarily how does one ontological substance (objectivity) birth another ontological substance (subjectivity) and gain sentience. He's more along the lines of Whiteheadian process philosophy, as opposed to substance thinking. "Instead of asking 'How can I know of any other being is sentient?' the [other] question asks, 'How can I know if there is any other creature without consciousness or sentience?'" Also, "Without confirming evidence that consciousness or experience can occur only in connection with a brain, we should remain open to the possibility that consciousness may exist in the absence of a brain."
Lots of epistemological-ontological talk, brief examinations of extra-rational ways of knowing and understanding things. "Given that what is at issue is the mind-body relationship, it makes sense to use the body as an instrument of knowing as well as using the rational capacities."
His reasoning against materialism is simple: materialists must "(1) deny that consciousness or experience is ontologically a different kind from matter-energy; or (2) explain how ontological emergence could occur. [...] If (1), the materialists need to explain how subjectivity and objectivity could be identical in kind. [...] If (2), materialists need to explain how subjectivity could emerge from objectivity, how qualia could arise ex nihilo--how, in short, an entirely new ontological kind could emerge." The same goes for dualism, dualists must explain how mind and matter interact if they are two ontological substances.
I've long found it unconvincing to assume mind and emotions emerged from entirely unfeeling, mechanistic matter, and until de Quincey I'd never seen it proposed in a philosophical manner that matter and mind are intertwined.
